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Abstract
We analyze a sequential decision model, where in every period a
new agent seeks to determine the payoff of some actions. Every agent
receives a possibly uninformative signal about the payoffs, and she
observes previous choices. Some actions have a saturation effect ; i.e.,
their payoffs become zero if used repeatedly too often albeit the orig-
inal payoff is recovered later. We show that in every equilibrium and
for almost every equilibrium play path, an action will trigger a cyclical
herd behavior. We also show that the length of the transition phase
between two consecutive herd behavior is at most the time needed to
recover from the saturation effect. We thus give an alternative expla-
nation to Kirman (1993) for the cyclicity of herd behavior, based on
the negative externality generated by the repeated use of the same
action.




Many economic situations have in common that actions previously chosen
by a large group of agents can have a direct influence on future decision-
makers. For instance, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) provides some evidence
that managerial activities tend to follow this pattern. Such situations are
often described as herd behavior, where the information implicitly carried in
previous choices about the value of some particular actions may overwhelm
any private information or preferences of subsequent agents (see Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) for a formalization).
Of particular interest are situations where herd behavior are cyclical;
i.e., a particular action is chosen for some time by a large group of agents
in circumstances observationally equivalent to a herd behavior, then this
action is abandoned for a new one to possibly reappear later. For instance
in financial markets, periods of bull markets are usually followed by other
periods of bear markets on basis that can be largely construed as speculative
behavior driven by observations of previous investors.
Kirman (1993) presents other examples, and also provides a sound theo-
retical explanation to this phenomena. In Kirman’s model, the alternation
of belief-based decisions is explained as a long-run phenomena generated by
direct and noisy communication between agents about the value of some
actions. In equilibrium, a stationary distribution determine the probability
that a herd behavior is triggered by a particular action. However, this ap-
proach requires an effective communication device among agents, and does
not predict the length of the transition periods since alternations can occur
in any period with positive probability.
In this paper, we develop an alternative explanation to Kirman’s, where
cycles are triggered by public information instead of direct communication.
Our approach is based on the idea that cyclicity of herd behavior is driven
by publicly observable saturation effects caused by successive adoptions of
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the same action. That is, we argue that repeated adoptions of the same ac-
tion may trigger negative externalities, potentially leading future agents to
abandon this action as long as those negative externalities persist. Cyclicity
then appears as an equilibrium phenomena, where an action triggering a herd
behavior will surely disappear at some point because of saturation effects,
to possibly reappear later if those saturation effects are no longer present.
Our approach makes decisions leading to cyclical herd behavior solely contin-
gent on public information, in contrast to Kirman’s which relies on a direct
communication technology.
We next give an example to illustrate our point. Consider an art gallery
scheduling expositions for the upcoming year, and facing a large panel of
artists to present who must be capable of attracting a large public and po-
tential buyers. Spots are scarce, and setting up an exposition is costly. Even
if every artist has some merits in her own right, the gallery must figure out
which of them has the highest market value to maximize profits. The gallery
can base her decisions on previous experiences from the artist in similar sit-
uations, and elect those who have generated the highest profits in the past.
Market tastes are nevertheless changing, and a fashionable artist some time
ago may have run out of fashion because of over-exposure or exhaustion of
buyers for her works. Thus, the gallery must take into account the satura-
tion effect of previous experiences as well as the previous successes to make
optimal choices. Once the saturation effect is likely to have disappeared, a
previously successful artist is likely to be successful again if presented. Our
notion of saturation effect can explain why, for instance, it is common to
see expositions in African art then followed by modern artists in the same
gallery. This issue is ignored in the classical literature on herd behavior
(see Bikhchandani et al., 1992), which would predict in our example that a
successful artist once should be systematically presented.
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1 The model
In this section, a formal description of the model is given. It is derived from
that in Banerjee (1992). Our model generalizes this last reference in that we
allow for a finite set of actions to have positive payoffs among a continuum,
instead of one in this last reference. From a technical standpoint, we relax
two of the three tie-breaking rules that Banerjee imposes. This framework is
minimal to generate the results described in the Introduction.
Time is discrete and continues forever. In every period, a new player
appears and selects an action from the set [0, 1]. There are two types of
actions: any action a ∈ A = {a1, ..., an} (⊂ [0, 1]) has payoff da > 0, whereas
any other action in [0, 1] \ A has a payoff of zero. We reorder A so that if
i > j then di ≤ dj. An player does not know the set A nor the payoffs, but
she knows its cardinality n.
Every player receives a signal about A, which can take two forms. With
probability α > 0, the signal is informative and takes the form of an action
chosen from A. When receiving an informative signal, the action ai is received
with probability pi > 0 so that
∑
i pi = 1. We assume that signals satisfy
the following property.
Assumption 1 The sequence (pi)i=1,...,n is strictly decreasing.
That is, when receiving a signal we assume that a player is more likely to
know which action has the highest payoff. With probability 1−α, the signal
is uninformative and takes the form of a variable ξ /∈ [0, 1]. The nature of
the signal is private information.
Every player can observe all the previous choices of actions. Consider
the player living in period t > 1, for every sequence of observed actions
(a1, ..., at−1) we associate the information set {(a1, s1, ..., at−1, st−1)|
si ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {ξ} ∀i}. In other words, a player knows which actions have
been chosen, but she is uncertain about the signals previously received. The
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information set of the first player is defined to be the null set. A strategy for
the player living in period t assigns to every information set in period t and
to every received sinal a (possibly randomized) action.
Every player has a common prior belief about the signals previously re-
ceived at every information set. This prior belief is such that ξ (the uninfor-
mative signal) is received with probability 1− α, and with probability α the
informative signal is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
We say that an action a ∈ [0, 1] has a saturation effect if there exists
Na > 1 such that when t+Na players have consecutively chosen this action
after any period t then the payoff of a is 0 with probability pit′ > 0, for
every t′ ∈ {t +Na, ..., t + S} and for some integer S > Na. We assume that
the sequence (pit′)t′ is strictly decreasing and sums up to 1. After period
t+S, the action regains its original payoff with probability φt′ > 0, for every
t′ ∈ {t + S + 1, ..., t + V } and for some integer V > S, if it is not chosen
in any such period t′ and remains 0 otherwise. We assume that the finite
sequence (φt′)t′ is strictly increasing and sums up to 1.
The motivation for the notion of saturation effect is that, when choosing
repeatedly too often the same action, subsequent agents may find it worthless
with decreasing probability over time. This assumption can be justified as
negative externalities occurring when the action is chosen too often, as in
the example given in the Introduction. We keep the possibility of a decrease
in payoff exogenous to simplify the exposition, our basic insight remaining
the same when endogenous. The second aspect of the definition, namely that
the action recovers its original payoff with probability that increases with the
number of times the action is not chosen, captures the idea that the negative
externality caused by the repeated use of the same action disappears over
time as it gets temporarily abandoned.
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We assume that every player is risk-neutral and maximize the expected
payoff of her action, where the expectation is based on observed actions and
the signal received. Risk-neutrality is not central to our analysis. Similar
qualitative results obtain with risk-aversion instead, this issue is omitted to
simplify the analysis.
We must add a tie-breaking decision rule inherited from Banerjee (1992)
to carry out our analysis.
Assumption 2 If a player does not have a signal, and if all the previous
players (if any) have chosen a = 0, then this player will choose a = 0.
The action a = 0 can be construed as an exit option, chosen by a player
who has no information whatsoever about A. This assumption is consistent
with the prior belief of the player, who is indifferent between any action in
[0, 1] by assumption. Instead of randomizing, we impose this rational choice
as the only outcome in this case.
Every player updates her belief in a Bayesian manner according to avail-
able information. The structure of the game is common knowledge to every
player. The remainder of the paper is devoted to analyzing the Bayesian
Nash Equilibria of this game. It is easy to see that there exists a contin-
uum of such equilibria in this game; for instance, when a player believes that
some actions are equally likely to yield the highest payoff then any random-
ization among those actions can be justified as an equilibrium strategy. This
multiplicity of equilibria will not affect our qualitative analysis.
2 Cyclical Herd Behavior
In this section, we present our results on herd behavior. We first describe
our notion of cyclical herd behavior triggered by a particular action. We
then show that, in every equilibrium and for almost every equilibrium play
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path, there exists action in A will trigger a cyclical herd behavior. Finally,
we analyze the length of the transition phases between two consecutive and
distinct herd behavior.
We say that the action a triggers a herd behavior at the information
set h if, given available information at this information set, the action a is
chosen after receiving every possible signal. We also say that a triggers a
cyclical herd behavior along the infinite play path s if there exist a sequence
of information sets (ht)t∈N along s such that none of those information sets
are consecutive, and a triggers a herd behavior at every ht.
We next state our main result on cyclical herd behavior. The aim is to
know how often cyclical herd behavior occur, and which set of actions can
potentially trigger this phenomena. Central to the next result is that every
action with a positive payoff has a saturation effect.
Theorem 3 Assume that every action in A has a saturation effect. For
every equilibrium and for almost every equilibrium play path, there exists an
action in A that triggers a cyclical herd behavior.
The above result states that, in every equilibrium and for all but a set
of measure zero of equilibrium play paths, an action with positive payoff
will trigger a cyclical herd behavior. Implicit in the above result is that two
distinct actions can trigger cyclical herd behavior along the same equilibrium
play path, this can occur during the periods where the first action triggering
the cyclical herd behavior exhibits a saturation effect. However, the action
with the highest payoff will not necessarily triggers a cyclical herd behavior.
Indeed, one can easily see from the proof of Theorem 3 that the first action
in A to trigger a herd behavior will also trigger a cyclical herd behavior. This
action is chosen by the early players as a function of their received informative
signals, which can correspond to any action in A. Thus, saturation effects
cannot eliminate the social inefficiency that is often seen in herd behavior.
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3 Conclusion
We have thus introduced an alternative explanation to Kirman (1993) for
the occurrence of cyclical herd behavior. Our view is that saturation effects
resulting from the repeated use of the same action by a large population
leads to the end of any herd behavior that this action may have generated
in the past. However, when the saturation effects triggered by this action
disappear, or equivalently is perceived as disappearing, then the previously
abandoned action triggers a new herd behavior as it did originally.
From a game-theoretical standpoint, the basic insight of our approach is
that, when saturation effects are realized by agents, the informational gain to
subsequent agents from the adoption of an action by previous agents disap-
pear, and subsequent agents can no longer find it optimal to adopt it because
public information is no longer a reliable source of inference. However, when
the saturation effects are perceived to disappear, the informational structure
of subsequent agents is identical to that of previous agents who has chosen
the original action on informational grounds only. Consequently a new herd
behavior starts because subsequent agents find it optimal to adopt it for the
same informational reasons as previous agents did.
The origins of saturation effects are not addressed here, but rather are
taken as given. One could conjecture that psychological aspects play an
important role, as seems intuitive in industries such as fashion or art market.
Empirical studies are needed to test the validity of this conjecture.
A Technical proofs
We now prove the results stated earlier. We first present the well-known
Glivenko-Cantelli’ Theorem, which will used throughout. The proof of this
result is given in Fristedt and Gray (1997) p. 192 and extensions. It most
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states that, when dealing with identical i.i.d. drawings, the empirical distri-
bution function converges almost surely to the original distribution function.
Theorem 4 (Glivenko-Cantelli)
Let (Yn)n∈N be an i.i.d. sequence of R-valued random variables with common
distribution function F . For every y ∈ R, let 1y be the indicator function of







Then for every y, Fn(y)→ F (y) almost everywhere.
When applied to our setting, the above result roughly states that, for almost
every play path, the frequency of signals received by the players will converge
in distribution to the original way nature draws. This result will help us
in proving that some pathological infinite play paths have measure 0 with
respect to the choices of the nature.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We start our proof by presenting two simple technical lemmas, central to
determining optimal choices given available information.
Our first lemma states that receiving a signal is a better information than
observing a sequence of 0.
Lemma 5 Assume that, along a path, every player before period t has chosen
0. If Player t receives an informative signal, then she will follow it.
Proof. From an ex-ante standpoint, Player t believes that the event 0 ∈ A
has probability 0. Since all the previous players have chosen 0, by Assumption
2 Player t assigns probability 1 to the event that all previous players had no
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informative signal. Thus, Player t believes with probability 1 that she is the
only one to have an informative signal, and it is thus optimal to follow it.
Our second lemma states that observing two identical actions is more
informative about the best action than one signal alone.
Lemma 6 Fix any equilibrium, and assume that the same action (different
from 0) has been chosen by the first and second player. Then this action
triggers a herd behavior next period.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium, and let H be the event that the first two
players have chosen the same action a and player 3 has received the signal
a3. Clearly, if a3 = a then Player 3 will choose a. Otherwise, we compute
the probability of the event [a = ai] for every i, conditional on H, to derive
our result. We have that
P ([a = ai]|H) = α3p2i (1− pi) + α2(1− α)pi(1− pi). (1)
Moreover, we have that
P ([a3 = ai]|H) = α2pi(1− pi)(1− α). (2)
It is easy to see that, from (1) and (2) together with Assumption 1, the
expected payoff of choosing a is greater than that of a3, and thus Player 3
will choose to ignore her signal. The proof is complete.
The previous lemma states that observing two identical actions will offset
any private information. The intuition of the result is central to our analysis.
The first player to choose this action must have received the corresponding
signal, which as good as any signal received by Player 3 ex-ante. Moreover,
with strictly positive probability the second player has chosen this action
because he also received the corresponding signal. Thus, receiving twice the
same signal with strictly positive probability makes the corresponding action
more likely to have a higher payoff than any private signal Player 3 can
receive.
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With all the previous results, we can prove Theorem 3. We start our
proof by showing that, for almost every equilibrium play path, some action
in A will trigger a herd behavior. The remainder of the proof is based on the
method used to derive this property. From now on, we will refer to Player i
as i (for every i) to simplify the exposition.
Consider 1, if she has the uninformative signal she chooses 0 by Assump-
tion 2, and otherwise she chooses her own signal. Consider now 2, if she has
the uninformative signal she follows the same choice as 1, and otherwise one
must distinguish two cases. If 2’s signal matches 1’s action, then 2 follows her
signal. If 2’s signal is different from 1’s action then she randomizes between
1’s action and her own signal (2 does not randomize if 1’s action is 0, she
chooses her own signal instead by Lemma 5).
We now analyze the decision problem of 3. This player can observe four
different class of past actions: case a) both previous players have chosen 0;
case b) 1 has chosen 0 and 2 has chosen a2 > 0; case c) 1 and 2 have chosen
the same action; case d) two distinct actions have been chosen that are not
0. We next examine those four cases.
In case a), if 3 has the uninformative signal she chooses 0 by Assumption
2, and otherwise she chooses her own signal by Lemma 5. In case b), if
3 has the uninformative signal then she will choose a2, and otherwise she
randomizes between her own signal and a2. In case c), 3 always chooses
the action chosen twice by Lemma 6. In case d), if 3 has the uninformative
signal then she randomizes between the two previously chosen actions, and
otherwise one must distinguish two subcases. If 3’s signal is identical to one
of the previously chosen actions then she follows her own signal (the idea is
the same as in Lemma 6), and otherwise she randomizes between the two
actions and her own signal.
From the above analysis, it is easy to derive that the first action (different
from 0) to be chosen twice triggers a herd behavior at the information set
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immediately following the second choice, unless the signal received in this
period matches an already chosen and different action. By Theorem 4, for
almost every equilibrium play path every element in A will be drawn by
nature at least twice. Moreover, by Assumption 1 the set of play paths where
two different signals are always sent one after the other also has probability
0. Thus, by an argument similar to that in Lemma 6, for almost every path
an action in A will be chosen often enough to rule out the above case. Thus,
for almost every equilibrium play path, there exists an action in A that will
trigger a herd behavior.
By an argument similar to that in Lemma 6, once an action in A has
trigger a herd behavior at a particular information set, it will also trigger a
herd behavior at the following information set. Since every action in A has
a saturation effect, it follows that once a ∈ A has triggered a herd behavior
for the first time, it will also trigger Na−1 consecutive herd behavior until it
becomes common knowledge that its payoff may become 0 for the next S+V
consecutive periods with positive probability.
However, after those S+V periods the information structure of every sub-
sequent player about which action has the highest payoff is identical to that
of the players who followed the previous herd behavior. Thus, any optimal
action for those players must also be optimal for the subsequent players, and
a new cycle of herd behavior start. This situation will be repeated infinitely
often, proving the result. The proof is now complete.
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